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Konference a kongresy

  • "VII. Conference of Czech Political Science Association (CPSA)", the Czech Republic: Prague, September, 6th – 7 th, 2018; (doc. Laboutková)
  • "The International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Policy" , Research insitute VSEO, the Czech Republic: Čeladná, September , 4th – 6th, 2018; (doc. Laboutková, doc. Bednářová, dr. %Simral, prof. Žák)
  • "12th ECPR General Conference", Germany: Hamburg, August 22nd – 26th, 2018; (doc. Laboutková, dr. Šimral)
  • "XXIX Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Public Economics" (SIEP). Italy: Catania, September 21st and 22nd, 2017. (doc. Laboutková, Ing. Fišar, dr. Šimral, doc. Bednářová) http://www.siepweb.it/siep/it/xxix-conferenza-2017

  • "13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017". Liberec: Technical University of Liberec, 11. – 13. 9. 2017 (doc. Laboutková, Ing. Fišar, prof. Žák, dr. Šimral, doc. Bednářová) http://www.lef-tul.cz/sekce/LEF_2017.pdf
  • "Current Trends in Public Sector Research",Katedra veřejné ekonomie ESF MU, Šlapanice u Brna, 19. – 20. 1. 2017; (doc. Laboutková, Ing. Fišar) 
  • "XIV. mezinárodní vědecká konference Hospodářská politika v členských zemích Evropské unice", SU OPF a EkF VŠB-TUO, 14. – 16. 9. 2016; (doc. Laboutková, prof. Žák). 
  • "European meeting of the Economic Science Association 2016", ESA, Norwegian School of Economics in Bergen, 31. 8. –  3. 9. 2016; (Ing. Fišar)
  • "24th World Congress of Political Science: Politics in a World of Inequality", IPSA, Poznań, 23. – 28. 7. 2016; (doc. Laboutková)
  • "21st Central European Political Science Association Conference: Chalenges for Political Leaders in Central and Eastern Europe", CEPSA, Ljubljana, 3. – 4. 6. 2016; (doc. Laboutková, dr. Šimral)
  • "Podnikání a inovace podnikatelských aktivit XI.",Vysoká škola mezinárodního podnikání ISM Slovakia v Prešově, 27. – 28. 4. 2016; (prof. Žák)
  1. Vnoučková, L. and M. ŽákPerception of Transparency of Lobbying: First Empirical Approach. In: Kocourek, A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017. Liberec: Technical University of Liberec, 2017, pp. 466-473. ISBN 978-80-7494-349-2. Abstract: The benefits of transparent lobbying are often discussed. The theoretical grounds result in a statement that they may contribute to the democratic environment and the efficient allocation of public funds. But the real perception of lobbying has not been investigated. Therefore, this study focuses on the perception of transparency of lobbying in sample organisations in the Czech Republic. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the perception of the premise that adequate lobbying and transparency of lobbying has the potential to be viewed positively by stakeholders. Data for the study was gathered from a sample of businesses, non-profit organisations, and other institutions in the Czech Republic. Totally, 73 organisation/institution members took part in the survey. One respondent per organisation/institution was questioned. The results show that 80% of respondents perceive transparency of lobbying positively. Remaining 20% of respondents partly disagree with the positive impacts of transparent lobbying. Moreover, statistically significant differences were found between three  observed groups (business, non-profit and other institutions). Non-profit organisations perceive transparency of lobbying statistically significantly better than respondents from business and other institutions. This article may be considered as a case study of perception of transparency of lobbying in the Czech Republic. Other studies may conduct further research on the found direction in terms of information flows.
  2. Šimral, V. Regulating Lobbying in Europe: No Model Fits All?  In: Kocourek, A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017. Liberec: Technical University of Liberec, 2017, pp. 456-465. ISBN 978-80-7494-349-2. Abstract: The paper addresses the question whether there are common transposable standards on which lobbying laws in individual European countries may be based. First, lobbying and other anti-corruption regulations currently in force in European countries are shortly described. Lobbying regulations in the US and at the EU level and their development are subsequently discussed in more detail. Second, the paper asks whether a common definition of lobbying may be found and what is its value for academic research. Third, anti-corruption legislation in European countries is subjected to comparative analysis with the aim to find links between legal regulations and transparent lobbying. The core of the paper features a  juxtaposition of corruption levels and adopted legal regulations. The cases of France, Estonia, Poland, and Latvia a re highlighted as  different approaches that are supposed to achieve the same goal. Finally, the results of the analysis indicate that there indeed may be a  common core of lobbying regulations which improves the quality of the anti-corruption legal framework at the national level; however, the significance of details of such regulations and their complementarity cannot be overstated. To develop these standards further and offer
    them to real-world practitioners should be the next step in this research agenda.
  3. Fišar, M. Possibilities to Investigate Transparency and Lobbying in Controlled Environment. In: Kocourek, A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017. Liberec: Technical University of Liberec, 2017, pp. 431-438. ISBN 978-80-7494-349-2. Abstract: Transparency and lobbying, two terms that have direct influences on the behavior of policymakers, politicians, and bureaucrats. Models of both  transparency and lobbying exist for decades and are being researched by not only academics but non-profit international organizations and institutions that provide governments with policy recommendations. The recommendations are, however, often based on research that is complicated or almost impossible to perform or relies on self-report surveys by the public officials and policy makers. The real behavior of those actors might, therefore, be hidden. Therefore, there opens an opportunity to model these situations and bring transparency and lobbying into the laboratory or field controlled environment and investigate the behavior of involved actors using methods of experimental economics. As the experimental economics is a field of economic research that has been emerging in the main flow for las few decades, the research on transparency and lobbying is, therefore, emerging as well. There have been published studies that focused on transparency and studies that investigated lobbying, however, the number of publications on experimental research on transparent lobbying is limited. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to provide an overview of experimental research on lobbying and transparency, evaluate the findings and provide suggestions for future research.
  4. Laboutková, Š. Identifying a Connection between Transparent Lobbying and Quality of Democracy. In: Kocourek, A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017. Liberec: Technical University of Liberec, 2017, pp. 439-446. ISBN 978-80-7494-349-2. Abstract:  Considering the core of democratic principles – freedom, equality, and control, one of the relevant dimensions of quality of democracy is participation. Creating opportunities for 

    individuals and groups to talk to policy and decision makers and legislators is a part of 

    the democratic process by which policy is formulated, implemented and tested. But some 

    of these influences might have greater access to policy makers due to their bigger 

    economic power. Some groups or individuals try to act/lobby behind closed doors and in 

    secret. The problem of lack of transparent lobbying – lobbying by the rules – is closely 

    related to decreased equality of access by voices representative of a wide range of 

    interests to public decision-making. Similarly, formal institutions in the form of rules as 

    well as the balance of political  forces in society are considered to be endogenous, because 

    they are chosen within the society. When selecting them, conflict of interests between 

    different groups and individuals can be expected. Thus, there is a danger that institutions 

    can develop to the benefit of stronger groups at the expense of others. A transparent 

    environment where groups negotiate and transparency in the promotion of diverse 

    interests – transparent lobbying – can significantly reduce this risk. Therefore, it is 

    necessary to identify the connection between  transparent lobbying and quality of 

    democracy, in other words to investigate the influence of transparent lobbying on the 

    process of  democratization.
  5. Bednářová, P. Transparent Lobbying – the Costs Connected with It. In: Kocourek, A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017. Liberec: Technical University of Liberec, 2017, pp. 411-419. ISBN 978-80-7494-349-2. Abstract: Lobbying transparency increase can be considered a specific public project, i.e. a systemic proposal of public funds allocation. The aim of the article is to identify the costs associated with transparent lobbing. Modern dynamic indicators which analyse costs (input) of a project and are related to its utilities (output) are reflected from the viewpoint of public project evaluation. The used CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) method was specified on the basis of the delimitation of characteristics and attributes of transparent lobbying. The evaluation of the project is performed on the basis of the creation of a specific model of a social-economic analysis in a non-reduced form. The model works with the delimitation of quantifiable and non-quantifiable costs and benefits of the project. The basic variants of the final states were determined, namely: 1) the existence of the current legislation and 2) the project variant of lobbying transparency increase, which was further divided into 2.1) a project variant of lobbying transparency increase by means of legislation changes and 2.2) a project variant of lobbying transparency increase on the basis of self-regulation principles. From the viewpoint of costs, the second option is financially more demanding and mainly the option of implemented legislation changes. The variant by means of self-regulation can, but does not have to, be accompanied by additional costs. The first variant is not connected with any immediate financial costs. The selection of the most suitable variant will be done in relation with the presupposed acquired quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits. 
  6. Laboutková, Š. and P. Vymětal. Measures of Transparent Lobbying: How to Approach It and Evaluate It: A Preliminary Stage. In: Matějová, L. (ed.) Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017. Brno: Masaryk University, 2017. pp. 50-57. ISSN 2336-1239. ISBN 978-80-210-8448-3. Abstract: Although the topic of lobbying attracts many scholars and activists, the evaluation of its quality is underdeveloped. The paper's aim is to propose a comprehensive catalogue of key measures of transparent lobbying that offers the space for later evaluation of the transparency of lobbying regulation and activities for discussion. The authors employed the qualitative analysis of existing approaches, namely the evaluation of "hard" lobbying regulation by the Centre for Public Integrity and recommendations of "transparency" measures by various international organisations, and finally propose their own set (catalogue) of measures that employs both the hard direct rules on lobbying, but also the indirect rules linked to lobbying, and informal rules and voluntary activities are also included. 
  7. Fišar, M., J. Špalek and D. Urbancová. Ex-ante Targeting in Lobbying Strategies: An Experimental Study. In: Matějová, L. (ed.) Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017. Brno: Masaryk University, 2017. pp. 20-26. ISSN 2336-1239. ISBN 978-80-210-8448-3. Abstract: As lobbying is currently an activity necessary for many interest groups including non-profit organizations, it is important to analyze a variety of potential strategies lobbyists may apply. We conducted a replication of a previous experiment to see whether theories about the ex-ante targeting of different policymakers hold. In the experiment, either two or three players of two types bid on simulated policymakers in order to succeed. In this article, we analyze two basic strategies – the theories of coalition expansion and counteractive lobbying – in terms of how often lobbyists target ex-ante supporters, the opposition, and undecided policymakers. We also focused on the size of lobbyist expenditures. Our investigation suggests that neither of the investigated strategies prevailed and other strategies may be naturally used by lobbyists. 
  8. Laboutková, Š. and   M. Žák. 2016. Transparency of Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach. In. Majerová I. and E. Kotlánová (ed.). Proceedings of 14th International Conference Economic Policy in the European Union Member Countries. Karviná:Silesian University, pp. 368 – 377. ISBN 978-80-7510-210-2. Abstract: The positive benefits of transparent lobbying are investigated, as they may contribute to the democratic environment and the efficient allocation of public funds. This premise is based on the hypothesis that adequate consultation of changes and new legislation with stakeholders has the potential to contribute to the improvement of the decision-making process (and its legitimacy) on the management of public funds. This overcomes some major challenges relating to the regulator and the regulated (asymmetric information, moral hazard, and professional lack of knowledge of the regulator). A higher quality of public administration, in turn, reduces corruption and leads to greater transparency in decision-making, including lobbying. Or vice versa, non-transparent lobbying can lead to illegal practices of influence, corruption, and its economic implications. The aim of this article is to study the links among government, lobbyists, businesses, and citizens in terms of information flows and to design a preliminary model of such links and identify possible consequences.

Semináře a workshopy

  • Mezinárodní konference "Measuring Democracy: What are we measuring and how does CEE fit in?", 22. 9. 2017, Akademie věd České republiky. (prof. Žák)   
  • "Transparentnost a politická korektnost", SEEPS, Praha, 16. 5. 2016; (prof. Žák)
  •  "Private Actors in Politics and Policy-Making: Trespassers Producing Norms?", CEFRES a FF UK, Praha; (dr. Šimral)
  • ,,Etika v podnikání a hodnoty trhu", PS PČR, Praha, 8. 6. 2016; (prof. Žák)
  • "The use of the 'red flags' warning system for public procurements – for a more transparent use of EU-funds", OLAF a TI Maďarsko, Budapešť, 27. 10. 2016; (doc. Laboutková)
  • "Anticorruption and fraud: detection and measurement", AAUni, Praha, 7. 4.2017; (doc. Laboutková, dr. Šimral)
  • "Veřejné konzultace k přípravě věcného záměru zákona o lobbingu", Úřad vlády ČR, Praha, 12. 4. 2017; (doc. Laboutková, dr. Šimral)
  • "Training for civil society organisations on tax avoidance", EU, Brusel, 15. -16. 6. 2017; (doc. Laboutková)
  • " European Open Government Leaders´Forum", Milano, 5. 2. 2018; (doc. Laboutková)
  • "Tisková konference Transparency International k indexu vnímání korupce 2017", TI, Praha, 21. 2. 2018; (doc. Laboutková)
  • "Transparentnost a zákonná regulace lobbingu" APAA a PS PČR, Praha, 13. 3. 2018; (doc. Laboutková, prof. Žák)
Ekonomická fakulta Technické univerzity v Liberci